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Abstract. France holds the second-largest 
shale gas reserves in Europe but became the 
first country to enact a ban on hydraulic frac-
turing in July 2011. A conservative government 
issued 64 research and exploration permits in 
early 2010, but half a year later a strong anti-
fracking movement emerged which pushed for a ban. The govern-
ment caved in to enormous political pressure, revoking three per-
mits and limiting the rest. Once the Socialists won the presidency 
and legislative majorities, they reaffirmed a strict stand against 
fracking. The article shows how the ban developed and puts the 
government’s position into the context of economic and industrial 
challenges. The author argues that essentially, France is waiting 
for discovery of environmentally friendly extraction methods. The 
law which created the ban still leaves some options. Also, there 
has been growing pressure to open up the debate about shale gas 
again. The article suggests possible ways to reconfigure public 
debate about the resources and technology. 
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Introduction 
The 2012 Gallois Report on France’s competitiveness, commis-
sioned by President François Hollande, painted a troubling pic-
ture: the economic situation in France was still affected by the fi-
nancial crisis. The country was struggling to regain its former in-
dustrial strength. Growth of GDP was stagnating, reaching only 
0.2 percent in 2012. Unemployment stood at 10.8 percent, alarm-
ingly the highest rate ever recorded. More than three million peo-
ple were searching for new employment (Shale Gas Europe, 
2012b). Hollande’s Socialist Party-led coalition government has 
not been able to reduce these negative economic indicators signif-
icantly; its popularity is declining because election campaign 
promises could not be kept. In addition, austerity measures am-
plify the negative effect on the economy.  
While struggling with these economic policy challenges, the 
French government is dedicated to reform energy policy and rear-
range the country’s energy mix. Currently, 58 nuclear reactors 
supply about 75 percent of energy demand, giving France relative 
high energy independence. This number is set to be reduced to 50 
percent by 2025 (euractiv.com, 2012). Questions remain how this 
and a further transition to renewable energy sources like wind 
power, hydroelectric, tidal power or solar energy can be managed. 
Critics say France has not accomplished much in recent years. Yet 
the current French government is fully dedicated to the EU’s cli-
mate policy goals, and as one of Europe’s industry and consump-
tion leaders, it has a leading role to play. By 2020, Europe’s carbon 
dioxide emission ought to be reduced by 20 percent, based on the 
1990 reference year. By 2030, the amount is supposed to be re-
duced by 40 percent and even 60 percent by 2040. In 2050, the EU 
member states plan to have their carbon dioxide emission reduced 
by 80-90 percent (euractiv.com, 2012). 
One proposition is to turn to natural gas as a transition fuel, and 
hopeful voices have pointed to a wealth of gas sealed in the coun-
try’s ground: The U.S. Energy Information Administration esti-
mates that France, after Poland, has the second-largest reserves of 
shale gas in Europe. Deposits could amount to five trillion cubic 
metres, of which 20-30 percent may be technically recoverable 
(EIA, 2013). How much gas there really is, however, can only be 
measured if companies were allowed to drill test wells, using the 
controversial hydraulic fracturing method. But since 2011, when 
the Nicolas Sarkozy government prohibited fracking in France, the 
procedure has been unavailable for exact estimates of deposits.  
Among the 22 policy measures the Gallois Report recommend-
ed to the government was one to develop technology research on 
shale gas exploration, suggesting that unconventional gas could 
have profound effects on the French economy. The Report pointed 
to effects in the United States: As energy price decrease, the coun-
try experiences job growth and a process of reindustrialization 
(Shale Gas Europe, 2012b).  
Reindustrialization was also something Hollande had addressed 
during his election campaign. Clearly, domestic energy cost is an 
important factor for energy-intensive French industries if they are 
to stay competitive and not be lured to relocate to countries like 
the U.S. This would threaten France with further job loss and less 
state income. Another aspect is reliance on imports. France has 
only very small conventional gas fields and has become the sixth-
largest gas importer in the world, and is importing 98 percent of 
its gas supply, mostly from Norway (31 percent in 2010), the Neth-
erlands (15 percent), Russia (14), and Algeria (13), with 71 per-
cent coming in via pipeline and 29 as LNG (Energy Delta Institute, 
2012). Having a greater domestic gas supply could give France an 
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advantage in commercial diplomacy (Harsem & Claes, 2013, p. 
791). “If we could have a low cost national gas,” renowned French 
energy economist Jean-Marie Chevalier has stated, “it would do 
wonders for the French economy and for our options for negotia-
tions with the Russians or the Algerians” (de Saint Jacob, 2011). 
Fracking Fury and State Response 
With remarkable speed, France moved from a spontaneous 
emergence of an anti-fracking movement in late 2010 to a half-
year moratorium on fracking and then parliament passing a law for 
an outright ban in 2011. 
In early 2010, some twenty domestic and foreign energy firms 
applied for shale gas research and exploration permits by ministe-
rial decree. The government, represented by environment minister 
Jean-Louis Booloo, granted permits to companies such as Total 
E&P France, Schuepbach Energy (in a joint venture with GDF 
Suez), Mouvoil, Toreador Resources, Vermilion Energy, Bridge-
oil, Hess Energy or European Gas Limited. This was not much 
publicized, and the parliament did not debate the decisions. Inside 
the government, no one really questioned the drilling permissions. 
There was some regulation in place covering hydraulic fracturing, 
and under that framework had been used dozens of times in France 
without any negative reports (Martor, 2012). 
Although companies like Total did issue timely press releases 
about winning permits, facts became only widely known half a 
year later as a critical discussion developed in late 2010. That co-
incided with the release of the U.S. documentary, Gasland. Envi-
ronmental groups initiated a series of events informing citizens in 
affected areas, partly in the Paris Basin but mostly in the French 
South, about shale gas, the fracking method, and the U.S. experi-
ence as presented by Gasland. The film was routinely used in town 
meetings. Other aspects factored in. For example, an unusual 
spring drought sensitised farmers about water management, and a 
region set for unconventional gas exploration, the Causses-Cé-
vennes, was marked as an Unesco world heritage site, stirring con-
troversy about possible damage by industrial development (de 
Saint Jacob, 2011). A number of arguments against hydraulic frac-
turing were brought up: First, people and communities near drill-
ing sites could suffer from stress, noise and traffic by site construc-
tion. The second negative aspect was seen in using tremendous 
amounts of water, possible impact of chemicals on ground water, 
and waste water disposal. The biggest concern was contamination 
of drinking water. Fear and controversy was intense, and politi-
cians became very aware of this.  
The French countryside saw rallies, demonstrations and petition 
drives in otherwise very quiet villages and communes. Local 
groups of citizen activists (“collectifs”), mayors, councils, and 
heads of départements soon drafted protest resolutions, protest 
websites were created, and mainstream media echoed the new 
movement’s campaigns. José Bové, a Green Party (Europe Écolo-
gie-Les Verts, EELV) member of the European parliament and 
well-known environmental activist, was among the prominent 
campaigners from established party opposition – particularly the 
Greens and the Socialists, but also the radical right’s Front Na-
tional – to the government led by Nicolas Sarkozy’s Union pour 
un Mouvement Populaire (UMP).  
Clearly the opposition hoped to increase its political capital 
from building pressure before upcoming elections – a September 
2011 election for the Senate, which is primarily chosen by munic-
ipal officials, and the presidential and parliamentary elections in 
2012.  
As a result of their efforts, environmentalists and residents of 
the concerned regions forwarded a petition of more than 100,000 
signatures to the French parliament (Patel, 2011).  
From moratorium to prohibition 
In February 2011, Prime Minister François Fillon’s government 
announced a drilling moratorium which was in April extended to 
June. A scientific commission was asked to study potential eco-
logical impact. The new UMP environment minister, Nathalie 
Kosciusko-Morizet, called her predecessor Booloo’s permits an 
“error.” The permits should have never been issued, as the frack-
ing technology is uncontrollable, and the U.S. experience had 
shown substantial damage to the environment. Independent from 
the technology, Kosciusko-Morizet said, opening up a new global 
age of fossil fuels would be the wrong policy (AFP, 2011). Mean-
while, the movement’s initial moratorium demands were replaced 
by more radical calls for a total ban on fracking. Economists and 
technical experts put up counter arguments in an energized debate, 
but their efforts were futile as anti-fracking pressure mounted. 
In March 2011, bills against fracking were introduced in the par-
liament, which intensely debated. One bill was proposed by con-
servative UMP member Christian Jacob, who won government 
support. His bill would become informally known as “loi Jacob,” 
the Jacob Law. In July 2011, the National Assembly and Senate 
passed Law 2011-835. It forbids “exploration and exploitation of 
liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons through hydraulic fracturing” and 
enables government to discontinue “the research permits which in-
clude projects using hydraulic fracturing” (Martor, 2012). 
So France became the first country in Europe – indeed, in the 
world – with a concrete legal, indefinite ban on fracking. Notably, 
the ban was passed by a conservative party majority under a con-
servative president who otherwise was known for pro-business 
and pro-industry views, not particularly for environmental con-
cerns. The law can be interpreted partly as a tactical response to a 
perceived political threat in rural France.  
From the law it followed that three permits for operating com-
panies were cancelled immediately. These directly hit Total and 
Schuepbach Energy. The other 61 permits, including projects for 
conventional gas and oil, were allowed to stand when companies 
verified that they were not making use of hydraulic fracturing. 
Since the government did not forbid mining of unconventional gas 
in general but only the method of hydraulic fracturing, there is still 
an open door for other methods (Götze, 2011).  
Thus, adversaries were not fully satisfied with this law because 
it still provides scope for discussion and interpretation. Radical 
opponents argue for a law that forbids any sort of fracking. More-
over, they do not trust the companies which could retain their per-
mits. Naturally, the energy companies were not satisfied with this 
solution either. Companies like Total, GDF Suez and foreign firms 
have continued to lobby and publicly argue to revive the debate 
about “hydro fracking.” But so far, the French government has rig-
idly kept to its position and refuses all incoming requests.  
The President’s strong stand and a fractured cabinet 
Upon his 2012 election, President Hollande made a personal 
stand that during his presidency, fracking would stay banned. That 
implies that even an open discussion about the subject is non de-
sired. The government does not show any interest in discussing 
new solutions or any changes to existing laws. Authorities are very 
precautious, because they know how sensitive the French people 
are about the topic and because they know that the gas will remain 
in the ground. It can still be extracted at a later point in time, as 
safer extraction methods may become available.  
In July 2012, Environment and Energy Minister Delphine Batho 
(Socialists) reaffirmed: “The government clearly and distinctly 
maintains the ban on exploiting shale gas because nowhere in the 
world has it been proven that this exploitation can be done without 
significant environmental damage and important health risks” 
(Phys.org, 2012).  
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In September 2012, President Hollande opined that fracking in-
volved “heavy risk to health and the environment;” he announced 
that his government was to reject seven pending applications for 
drilling permits in the South from companies looking for shale gas. 
No permits would be given during his presidency (Shale Gas 
Europe, 2012c). 
The Socialist Party includes some politicians more friendly to 
shale gas development. As an often provocative voice in the cabi-
net, Industry Minister Arnaud Montebourg is openly in favour. 
“Occasional harm from fracking is a reality,” he admitted but said 
if natural gas were to reduce nuclear energy, “it would be better to 
produce it here than import it. This question has to be put on the 
table” (Patel, 2012).  
He has also floated the idea that, in line with classic French in-
dustrial policy, a state-backed or state-owned national company 
might be created to keep shale gas exploration under exclusive 
public control, and proceeds could finance the transition towards 
green energy (Gentili, 2013). Montebourg believes France should 
exploit its shale resources in an “environmentally friendly” way. 
“A new generation of clean technologies can allow extraction 
without destruction,” Montebourg has stated, emphasizing “we 
could come up with the technology in a very short time to be able 
to exploit the gas ecologically” (McPartland, 2013). 
But on this question, Montebourg is isolated in Hollande’s cab-
inet. One reason why that is so, it has been suggested, is the So-
cialists’ reliance on Greens/EELV support. “Everyone is aware 
that there is a political issue that involves the relationship between 
parties forming the presidential majority,” said secretary-general 
of the CGT labour union, Bernard Thibault. The president had to 
satisfy their requests in order to count on them in other political 
areas (Grealy, 2012).  
While the Greens have only had limited electoral success, green 
issues today have a far wider appeal to the general public than only 
a decade ago. Even conservatives have conformed with this, sup-
porting the 2005 amendment to the constitution of “Charte de l'en-
vironnement” and for a path toward sustainability and a strong pre-
cautionary principle in policy-making.  
Another reason why shale gas is lacking popularity among the 
French is probably because there are differences in mineral rights 
ownership. Landowners in the U.S. can claim property rights not 
only on what is on their ground but also what is beneath it; this 
includes all raw materials and precious resources (Wang & 
Krupnick, 2013). Such economic incentives can reduce local resi-
dents’ resistance as they lease the rights for substantial income. 
That is not the case in France and hence, they are solely expecting 
disadvantages and inconveniences.  
The Legal Framework 
The process of hydraulic fracturing falls under the Mining Code 
in France. The code includes protection of water and environment. 
Both are affected by the procedure. According to Mitchell and 
John (2011), there is a certain procedure for handling requests for 
fracking. If a company wants to drill in a certain area, it has to 
apply for an exclusive research permit from the minister responsi-
ble for mining. Application documents have to include who might 
be affected by the measures, for example residents near the drilling 
site. There is only a 200m distance required to other persons’ prop-
erty. If the permit is granted, the applicant receives ownership on 
everything he finds beneath the ground. The minister conveys the 
responsible prefect of the area. The prefect has to seek consulta-
tion with local environment, development and housing agencies in 
order to hear different sides. Having built his opinion according to 
the given information and advice, the prefect gives feedback to the 
minister (Mitchell & John, 2011).  
Scope for research and alternatives 
Three additions to the law are noteworthy. A first required that 
a special commission be formed to provide well-founded opinion 
on research-based experiments with hydraulic fracturing. This 
commission includes industry and science, local authorities and 
state representatives. It was expressly set up for the purpose of ori-
entation, monitoring and evaluation. This special commission has 
the competence to authorize an operator to exceptionally use hy-
draulic fracturing for scientific purposes.  
A second clause is about the necessity of reports from operators. 
Those who still retain permits are supposed to send reports peri-
odically in order to prove that they are not using hydraulic fractur-
ing. A third addition requires annual commission reports, and in 
turn, government reports to the parliament, about developments in 
other countries. If there are any breakthroughs or innovations that 
could be interesting for France, the government can suggest 
changes in the legal framework. Moreover, the results of publicly-
controlled hydraulic fracturing research shall be reported 
(Mitchell & John, 2011). 
The law gives some insight to the government position towards 
fracking. Its definition is rather vague, and it has been suggested 
that alternative methods, close to fracking but called stimulation 
instead, might be admissable. There is still scope for experiments. 
If there is any solution that does not involve hazardous chemicals, 
the law could be bypassed. The law also shows that the fundamen-
tal decision is postponed to a later point in time, when the proce-
dure may be sufficiently safe in the government’s assessment. The 
law’s purpose is to gather more information.  
The government is observing how European neighbours deal 
with the issue. Since the reports required by the commission are 
annual, one can conclude that a possible change of course will take 
years because reporting periods are rather long. There is also the 
commission, working as a quiet forum for open discussion about 
the technology, and it is even able to grant permits on an exception 
basis.  
The ban is therefore not absolute; it is based on the premise that 
research and better technology may lead to a legalisation of frack-
ing procedures. Finally, the law did not revoke all 64 permits, al-
lowing companies to keep their investment commitment and pur-
sue exploration, albeit under some restraint, until the situation has 
improved for them (Mitchell & John, 2011).  
The government likely had in mind that companies might sue in 
court for civil damages if all licenses had been revoked (de Saint 
Jacob, 2011). France has not given up completely on the idea of 
exploiting unconventional gas, and the law is not at all prohibiting 
searching for it. It only restricts utilisation of a specific technique. 
Business: Trying to Reopen Debate 
The 2011 act affected several energy companies. Two compa-
nies stood out because their permits were revoked: Schuepbach 
Energy, which had two research permits for about 9,000 square 
kilometres in the South of France and in the Paris Basin, and 
French company Total, which for decades has engaged in conven-
tional natural gas in the Southwest of France (Lacq and Meillon 
fields).  
Total had initially received permission to explore about 4,300 
square kilometres in Southern France (South of Valence to the 
Montpellier region). The company tried to regain permission in 
Montelimar, pledging to only use conventional technologies. The 
company is very keen to explore new shale gas opportunities not 
only in their home market but also in worldwide (North and South 
America, and China) and in Europe, i.e. the United Kingdom, in 
Denmark and Poland (Oil and Gas Financial Journal, 2013).  
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The company illustrates in a presentation for stakeholders a 
number of key arguments that speak for unconventional gas. For 
example, Total argues that as conventional gas production is de-
clining, unconventional gas becomes progressively more im-
portant to the energy mix of industrialized nations. The firm also 
makes the case that it is of great importance for France to diversify 
energy supply to avoid too high dependency which could bare 
risks and be disadvantageous. Security of gas supply is of high 
significance for European countries, the firm insists (Total, 2012).  
Total shows great interest in reopening the debate about shale 
gas in France. In the firm’s perspective, France is missing a big 
opportunity. The company has proposed to the government that it 
could conduct publicly-controlled research in order to provide data 
for independent researchers. In addition, Total suggests its own 
research and development may help making fracking more envi-
ronmentally friendly. The firm operates in the United States and 
there collaborates with local energy companies, such as Chesa-
peake Energy, in order to share knowledge and experience. Total, 
as other oil and gas companies, lobbies the ministry of economy 
and environment (Rose, 2012). It also has not been shy to take its 
arguments public and launch a media effort to turn the debate 
around. For example, Total invited French journalists to visit its 
partner Chesapeake Energy’s fields in America (upi.com, 2012).  
 “They wanted my scalp” 
But the energy sector alone is unlikely to have enough political 
capital to reopen debate and sway the country’s leadership and 
public opinion; even though industry champions like Total and 
GDF Suez are affected and have the French Union of Petroleum 
Industries (UFIP) on their side. A broader alliance would seem 
necessary to build support, and there is one emerging.  
Following President Hollande’s outright no to shale gas under 
his presidency, in a September 2012 open letter to Hollande pub-
lished in business magazine L'Usine Nouvelle, 22 leaders appealed 
to reconsider the debate. Among those were powerful and influen-
tial people (De Jaegher, 2012). “We, the representatives of the in-
dustrial community, of its leaders, executives, technicians and 
workers, wish for a reopening of the debate on France’s potential 
in terms of shale gas,” the appeal read.  
The country has a “duty” to study its resource potential, and has 
a “unique chance” to be a leader in developing “clean” extraction 
methods. Once all the facts were on the table, “enlightened 
choices” could and should be made. “We ask the president to open 
a major national, public debate on shale gas, involving all relevant 
parties – citizens, NGOs, industrialists and researchers,” the sig-
natories wrote (Connexion, 2012).  
They included Laurence Parisot, president of the French Busi-
ness Confederation MEDEF, representing 750,000 companies; 
electronic firm Radiall’s CEO Pierre Gattaz, also president of the 
Group of Industry Federations (GFI) and the Electronic Industries 
Association FIEEC; Philippe Gœbel, president of the Chemical In-
dustries Union (UIC); Laurent Chabannes of the Energy Suppli-
ers’ Union (Uniden); François Roubaud of the Employers’ Con-
federation of Small and Medium Enterprises (CGPMF), and a 
range of other business association leaders and top managers from 
firms such as Sanofi, Solvay, or ST-Ericsson. Bernard van Craeyn-
est of the CFE-CGC labour union joined, as did university presi-
dents (De Jaegher, 2012).  
The open letter’s impressive line-up calling for a national debate 
proves that industry leaders, already engaging in open public crit-
icism of Hollande’s economic policies, are willing to challenge the 
government’s dominant wait-and-see attitude even if it means very 
public controversy which politicians would like to shy away from. 
How powerful these shale gas advocates was experienced by 
environment and energy minister Delphine Batho, who in June 
2013 went on a television and radio duel with Laurence Parisot of 
MEDEF about shale gas and hydraulic fracturing. A strong sup-
porter of renewable energy and nuclear phase-out, Batho was also 
one of the most enthusiastic opponents of the shale gas industry. 
In the heated debate with MEDEF president Parisot, who sharply 
criticised the “ad infinitum” prohibition policy for preventing a 
debate based on reliable data and better technology, Batho argued 
that any effort to look for shale would reduce necessary investment 
in renewable energy. She would not accept Parisot’s suggestion 
that shale gas could be useful as a transition fuel and contribute to 
financing renewables. The two women agreed only on one point, 
that France must reduce its dependence on gas imports, specifi-
cally Russian. But again, Batho would rather develop domestic bi-
ogas than allow for shale gas (Garoscio, 2012).  
Shortly after, Batho was dismissed from her position as envi-
ronmental minister, formally for criticising budget policy; but in a 
press conference, she held industry groups responsible: “The bat-
tle crystallized notably on the question of shale gas and more dis-
creetly on the reduction of nuclear in France,” Batho said; “these 
forces that I am talking about wanted my scalp.” (Natural Gas 
Europe, 2013; Patel, 2013). However, her successor Philippe Mar-
tin is also considered a long-time fracking critic. 
The fracking ban – unconstitutional? 
Industry has also chosen to challenge the government by litiga-
tion. American company Schuepbach Energy put its case before a 
regional administrative court, claiming its property and freedom 
of enterprise rights were violated by an unconstitutional law – the 
“loi Jacob” fracking ban, which had had the immediate effect of 
state withdrawal of the firm’s exploration licenses. Schuepbach 
said this went way beyond the precautionary principle anchored in 
the constitution’s environment charter, was disproportionate and 
also discriminatory: Schuepbach argued that hydraulic fracturing 
was just banned for search of shale gas but not for geothermal pro-
jects (Pottinger, 2013).  
Opinions differ whether stimulation used in geothermal sourc-
ing is comparable to hydraulic fracturing. Hence, geothermal and 
gas extraction methods were not treated equally under the law. Ap-
parently, drilling for geothermal sources bares slightly less risks 
than shale gas extraction but Schuepbach definitely had a reason-
able point to argue (Bloomberg, 2013).  
The case was referred as a priority issue of constitutionality 
(QPC) to the Constitutional Council – a legal decision-maker of 
last resort. In October 2013, the Council upheld the law as consti-
tutional, and dismisses Schuepbach’s arguments on all points 
(Conseil constitutionnel, 2013). Slim were then also chances of 
suing the French state for damages, claiming compensation for up 
to one billion euros in missed profits from 50 years’ gas produc-
tion (Schaub, 2013). 
Future Prospects 
In the near future the position of the French government will 
probably remain unchanged. Political tactics and election dates 
will continue to play a role; the next local elections in spring 2014 
require parties have to position themselves. The national govern-
ment has clearly a precautious approach towards shale gas, fearing 
negative effects on the environment – and so do the people of 
France.  
Public opinion definitely plays a decisive role. It was a broad 
popular movement that initially moved the Sarkozy/Fillon govern-
ment to take action against the energy companies. Hollande’s So-
cialists have even more reason to be very cautious in handling an 
unpopular, controversial issue. That shows that the people have 
great power over their government and that the government is very 
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likely to be influenced by strong movements. Unless public opin-
ion changes, it is very unlikely that the government reverses 
course. So far, there are only a few options to change the minds of 
the citizens.  
A first opportunity might lie in new technologies and proce-
dures which could replace current fracking practices. If they were 
less potentially harmful to health and environment, they could 
change the debate. At the moment research projects are going on, 
new promising technologies are being tested and improved. For 
example, pneumatic fracturing makes use of compressed air with-
out hazardous chemicals, and also increases efficiency.  
One disadvantage of hydraulic fracturing is that it is very inef-
ficient; only 20 percent of gas can be extracted from deposits. If 
that number were to increase drastically, it could make a differ-
ence. Another alternative might be gas extraction through electro 
shocks and pure water. But such attempts to make fracking 
“greener” will, according to scientists, need several years to ma-
ture (Xenius, 2013). Government-industry research cooperation 
could prove beneficial to amplify the process. The government 
should have economic incentives in finding environmentally 
friendly ways to extract gas.  
Secondly, economic incentives for landowners and near-site 
communities which outweigh inconveniences might change the 
level of public acceptance. In essence, the public, particularly at 
the local level, is asking for “a better deal:” Parts of the anti-frack-
ing movement are not in total opposition to unconventional gas or 
the fracking technology, but want positive perspectives on eco-
nomic opportunity, taxation and compensation – and do not want 
local communities to bear only long-term ecological and public 
health costs. This also is connected to the perception that global, 
especially U.S., firms dominate the gas projects and would take 
their profits abroad (Control Risks, 2012).  
The question of “what’s in it for me?” is one that is debated 
across European countries, and so are the issues of a government-
mandated or company-offered “citizen dividend” or “community 
dividend.” As long as public advantages stay abstract (energy sup-
ply security etc.) and only corporate profits look concrete, it is 
plausible that citizens and municipalities stay very sceptical and 
do not see themselves as positive stakeholders.  
Third, energy companies have to do their job and to educate 
people as stakeholders. This is particularly true when, as in France, 
personal experience with industrial oil and gas field development 
is very limited or non-existent. If firms want people’s approval for 
substantial changes in their environment, using questionable tech-
nology, they have to provide information. They have to engage 
with communities and major interest groups (Leifheit, 2011).  
In France, the firms’ applications for research and exploration 
permits came across as a stealth operation; the public was kept in 
the dark. Environmental groups framed the terms of debate when 
facts came out and companies began to start operations. Unsur-
prisingly, citizens and communities turned hostile.  
Companies failed in early communication. For new projects, 
they should first try to inform the people via a range of media and 
personal channels in order to increase awareness. For those resi-
dents who are directly affected by a drilling site, it would be wise 
to invite them to an existing site to show the works, and the safety 
and environmental precautions the company takes responsibility 
for. If methods become less strange and more familiar, people may 
be able to develop trust.  
Fourth, the French economy has serious structural problems and 
may not improve even in the long run. High unemployment and 
stagnant growth may induce government and public to give new 
technologies and innovation a chance to provide jobs and create a 
growth sector. The more people’s dissatisfaction increases, the 
more probable it becomes that the French government will open 
up debates about alternative paths – and that may include fracking.  
At one point, economic needs may outweigh concerns for the 
environment. Certainly research and a handful of gas projects can-
not have a substantial economic impact overnight. But energy 
companies could recruit a decent number of new employees, build 
fields and infrastructure. Some domestic supply may help decrease 
energy prices, improve competitiveness of French firms and the 
country’s attractiveness for investors (Shale Gas Europe, 2012a).  
Fifth, government and industry research provides information 
which could make public decision-making more transparent for 
citizens, which in turn should be involved at every step. With sup-
port of an expert task force, government could establish clear cri-
teria that have to be fulfilled for getting permission. This approach 
was chosen by South Africa. The country also had a moratorium 
on shale gas exploitation but after giving time to a task force for 
investigation they opened the process again and issued permits ex-
clusively for operations which passed a strict review and fulfilled 
criteria. This involved public consultation with affected stakehold-
ers (Shale Gas Europe, 2012c).  
Conclusion 
When the people’s movement demanded action from the French 
government, they were given a law which seemingly offers a few 
niches but still works as a strict ban to hydraulic fracturing as a 
method. A closer look at the law and the government’s positioning 
reveals that Paris is still interested in the subject but prefers to ob-
serve development in other European countries and wait for more 
environmentally friendly extraction methods. That is neither im-
plausible nor unwise, both in terms of politics and in terms of tech-
nology risk assessment.  
It is also understandable that French and foreign companies are 
impatient. But irreversible mistakes have been made several years 
ago. Companies and government failed to establish a transparent 
process and to appropriately educate the public. For those looking 
for ways to change the perception of fracking, they cannot ignore 
citizens and communities as major stakeholders.  
France has the second-largest reserves of unconventional gas in 
Europe, so it is unlikely anyone can afford to ignore this economic 
asset in the long run. It is true that the resource will remain valua-
ble and can be extracted later, when it would still be a welcome 
economic driver and helpful to reduce import dependency. At the 
moment France’s energy situation is not critical, thus the country 
can remain observing. Perhaps France can benefit from research 
breakthroughs or developments of other countries. But that is of 
course not a way to demonstrate technology leadership, of which 
France has always been so proud. 
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